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ABSTRACT
This article  reviews the United States 
Department of Defense, law  enforcement, 
and intelligence agencies’ use of the 
Maritime Strategic Doctrine and the Drug 
Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act to  combat 
drug smuggling vessels and boats during 
counter-drug smuggling operations. Threat 
analysis, using strategic warning indicators, 
is proposed and employed to analyze a 
range of factors: coalitions  between drug 
trafficking and terrorist organizations,  self-
propelled semi-submersible vessels, low-
profile vessels,  robotically controlled and 
human-piloted submarines, and recruitment 
of captains and crews  with the ability to 
pilot these vessels and boats.  Drug 
trafficking organizations and terrorist 
groups’  inter-technology transfer of sea-
based smuggling and terror tactics  are 
analyzed.  Circumstances  under which 
s t r a t e g i c w a r n i n g i n d i c a t o r s  m a y 
necessitate  policy changes  to  the Maritime 
Strategic Doctrine are described.
INTRODUCTION
Tell me what you know. Tell me what you 
don’t know. Tell me what you think. Always 
distinguish which is which.
General Colin L. Powell, USA, CJCS, 
1990 
Within the past year,  two different  drug 
trafficking  submarine construction projects 
were discovered: one in  Ecuador near  a 
tributary  close to the Colombian border  and 
the second in  Timbiqui, Colombia. The 
discovery  of submarine construction  sites 
again  raised the issue of threats posed by 
S o u t h  A m e r i c a n d r u g  t r a f f i c k i n g 
organizations (DTO) and terrorist  group 
coalitions. Upper  level  US policymakers are 
concerned about  terrorist  groups’ substantial 
control  over  construction sites for  low  profile 
vesse ls (LPV) , se l f -propel led semi-
submersibles (SPSS), and submarines in 
South  America.  US Representative Ted Poe, 
R-Texas,  announced during a  speech  in the 
House in May 2011:
Just to be clear, Mr. Speaker, intelligence 
tells us that these submarines are made by 
the Revolutionary  Armed Forces of 
Colombia, or FARC. That is the military 
wing of the Colombian Communist Party. 
Of course, that is how they finance their 
revolution  and the revolutionary  ideas in 
South America.1
 There are reports that the FARC has 
substantial control over  the construction 
process,  in  large part  due to the FARC 
controlling  the drug labs in  the jungles and 
the exit routes for drug trafficking. 2
FARC terrorist  groups, their  connection 
with  DTO,  and control of construction  sites 
raise concerns that  Middle Eastern  terrorist 
groups, which  have metastasized from 
western  Asia  to South America,  will gain 
access to SPSS and LPV  and use them  in 
terrorist  attacks. 3  These groups include 
Hezbollah  and Hamas, as well as Shining 
Path  Maoist-style narco-terrorists of Peru. 
Submarine discoveries in  Colombia  and 
Ecuador  raised questions of how  to assess the 
probability  that  DTO or  terrorist  groups 
employing  LPV, SPSS, or  submarines might 
attack  the United States, what form  the 
attacks would take, and whether  there is a 
method by  which  the United States could 
verify that an attack is imminent. 
The 1960s intelligence mission  of the 
National  Indications Center  provided 
strategic  warning  of possible attack  to the 
United States from  the Sino-Soviet  Bloc. The 
center’s threat  assessment model,  developed 
in  1963, shows promise when adapted for 
today’s threat  of sea-based drug smuggling. 
To achieve its mission, the center  developed a 
basic  inferential structure, referred to as an 
indicator  list,  which  defined 123  types of 
specific behaviors that  a  Sino-Soviet  Bloc 
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country  might  take if it  intended to wage war 
against the United States.  The specific 
occurrence of one of these behaviors was 
called an indication. “Indicators were used to 
develop strategic  warnings, which  differ  from 
tactical warnings in  timeliness and in 
derivation.” 4  Tactical  warnings rely 
exclusively  upon  mechanical  detection 
devices, such  as sonar nets which  cannot 
trigger  warnings until  the attack  has been  set 
in  motion,  thus providing no more than a  few 
hours and probably  much  less for  US forces 
to react. Conversely,  strategic  warnings given 
before a  strike is launched are derived from 
estimating enemy  intentions as well as 
specific behaviors. While the warnings are to 
some extent  dependent  upon  signals from 
mechanical detection  devices, they  also 
involve the analysis of a  great  deal of other 
data less easily quantified and correlated. 
The Ramsey  and Borner  model is based on 
a  research  study  that  quantified and ranked 
the relevance of different types of indicator 
patterns of different types of hostile  action 
indicating a  premeditated surprise attack  on 
the United States by  the Soviet  Union. In  this 
article,  probable strategic  warning  indicators 
based on analysis of observed behaviors of 
DTO and terrorist group coalitions are 
examined using  a  modified Ramsey  and 
Borner model.  The Colombian  Norte del Valle 
drug  cartel  and the FARC are compared 
against the Liberation  Tigers of Tamil  Eelam 
(LTTE),  a Sri Lankan  rebel/terrorist  group 
and the only  terrorist  group to have its own 
navy,  including  submarines. Terrorist  sea-
based attacks, such  as the Mumbai attack  of 
2008  during which  terrorist  kill teams were 
inserted in  country  by  way  of open water 
craft; North  Korea’s attacks on South  Korea, 
employing  submarine warfare; the 2005 
Abdullah  Azzam  Brigades rocket  attack on  US 
amphibious assault ships; and the al-Qaeda 
attacks in  January  and October  of 2000 
employing  open water  craft  are compared 
and contrasted using  the modified Ramsey 
and Borner model.5
Observable behaviors of DTO and terrorist 
groups in  South  America  indicate that 
smuggling and terrorist  group coalitions’ 
intentions and capabilities to construct LPV 
that  operate at  the surface, SPSS capable of 
dropping  several  feet below  the surface,  and 
submarines that  operate at depths as shallow 
as sixty-five feet  will  exist  as long  as they  are 
financially viable. 
Prior  to the demise of the LTTE in  2009, 
the group developed a  smuggling warfare 
navy  called the Kadal Puli,  or  Sea Tigers, 
which consisted of a  variety  of vessel 
classifications: suicide bomber,  LPV,  and 
SPSS for  penetrating  the Sri Lanka  Navy 
blockade, as well as patrol boats,  gunboats, 
and submarines. The Sea  Tigers constructed 
some of these craft in  their  own  boatyards. 
The Sea  Tigers also had a  flotilla  of 
commercial vessels including,  but not  limited 
to,  cargo and fishing vessels. Their initial 
missions were smuggling supplies (military 
supplies, weapons, etc.)  through  the narrow 
straits between  India  and Sri Lanka,  as well 
as piracy, robbery,  and finally  drug 
smuggling, the profits from  which  supported 
the antigovernment cause. 6  Additional 
missions included attacking  and sinking  Sri 
Lankan  Navy  vessels and supporting  the 
Black  Tigers – the ground troops of the 
LTTE.7   The Sea  Tigers are of interest  as a 
touchstone for a  three-way  comparison 
among DTO with  no terrorist  intent, 
narcoterrorists,  and terrorist  groups that  also 
engage in narcotic smuggling for profit.  
There may  be a concern that  DTO and 
terrorist  groups may  not cooperate because 
they  have different  motives.  However  an 
analogy  can be drawn  to land-based 
relationships that exist  between  organized 
crime and terrorist  groups. 8  The authors 
suggest caution  in making  assumptions 
concerning interactions in  reference to sea-
based interactions. For  example,  the 
problems of organized crime and terrorism 
were often considered separate phenomena 
prior  to 9/11.  Security  studies, the military, 
and law  enforcement seminars discussed the 
emerging  threat of transnational organized 
crime or  terrorism,  but  the important  links 
between  the two were rarely  made. This lack 
of linkage may  be due in  part  to the fact that 
organized crime and terrorism  are usually 
viewed as two different forms of crime. 
Organized crime’s main focus is economic 
profit, while terrorism  is often  viewed as 
motivated by  ideological aims and a  desire for 
political change. 
The 1990s can  be described as the decade 
in  which  the crime-terror nexus was 
c o n s o l i d a t e d a n d t h e t w o s e p a r a t e 
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organizations identifiable by  their  distinct 
motives began to reveal operational  and 
organizational  similarities.  In  fact, organized 
crime and terrorism  appear  to be learning 
from  one another  and adapting to each 
other’s successes and failures.9  Since 
September  11,  2001  nations acknowledge the 
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e s e 
organizations, especially  since terrorist 
groups now  use the services of organized 
crime to assist  their  activities and terrorists 
themselves engage in  organized crime 
activities as a  means of financial support. 
Furthermore,  terrorist  groups adopt methods 
to finance their  operations that were once 
believed to be within the province of 
organized crime. 10  Just  as land-based 
terrorist  groups have blurred motives and 
tactics that  may  resemble those of organized 
crime groups that  operate on  land, it  is not 
unreasonable to extrapolate the same 
analysis to the issues presented herein. 11
South  American  DTO’s inclusion  of 
submarines in their  smuggling  navies, with 
the capability  to cruise into US territorial 
waters,  raises the question of what the 
similarities and differences are between the 
vessels in  the DTO navies and the terrorist 
navies.  Moreover,  can  the similarities and 
differences between  the drug trafficking  and 
terrorist  navies be reliably  identified? To 
what extent do the similarities and 
differences indicate  shifts in  strategic 
thinking  and provide indicators of different 
types of threats to United States?
WHAT WE KNOW
South  American DTO constructed LPV  that 
cruise between  western and northern parts of 
South  America into eastern  and western  parts 
of Central  America.  LPV  have been  identified 
setting to sea  from  the west coast  of Colombia 
(Buenaventura).  These vessels cruise the 
Pacific  Ocean  and rendezvous off the 
southwest coast  of Mexico with  smugglers 
who transport  the drugs inland. A  second set 
of LPV  go to sea  from  the north  coast  of 
Colombia  and cruise through  the Caribbean 
Sea and rendezvous off the southeast  coast  of 
Mexico. Advantages of launching smuggling 
operations in  the Pacific  are the calmer 
waters and a  coast  that  is not  as closely 
monitored or  densely  populated as the 
Caribbean  shoreline. However,  the Caribbean 
shoreline offers access to hideaways in  the 
islands and direct routes to Central America 
and Europe. 12  LPV  smugglers have further 
increased the probability  of getting  through 
sea-based security  by  employing  navigation 
and communication equipment, stealth 
technology, and avoidance tactics.
A  common  land-based smuggl ing 
technique is to simultaneously  send multiple 
smuggling  vehicles using  a  variety  of 
smuggling  methods to cross territory, 
including  official entry  points. Sea-based 
smugglers mirror that  strategy  by  employing 
multiple LPV  or  SPSS simultaneously  to cross 
a  country’s territorial  waters. The United 
States’ sea  based national security  policy 
addressing the threat  posed by  sea-based 
smugglers was explained in  detail in  A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower, presented by  the chief of naval 
operations and the commandants of the US 
Marine Corps and US Coast  Guard at  the 
International Seapower  Symposium  in 
Newport, R.I.  on  Oct 17,  2007. The strategy 
draws the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast 
Guard even  closer  together  in  working to 
protect  and sustain the American  way  of life 
and is referred to in  this paper  as the 
Maritime Strategic Doctrine.13
What is different  about  sea-based 
smuggling  strategy  – from  a  national  security 
threat  assessment perspective – is that these 
smuggling  craft  are coordinated to penetrate 
territorial sea  boundaries on  both coasts of 
Central  America, a  strategy  analogous to 
coordinated penetration of Pacific  and 
Atlantic coastal territorial waters of the 
United States simultaneously.  To date, 
coordinated simultaneous penetration of a 
country  from  two different  directions of its 
land or  coastal borders has not  been observed 
except during  a  time of war.  Three factors 
inherent  in  South  American  DTO using  LPV 
and SPSS necessitate a  review  of sources and 
methods used to evaluate  threats they  may 
pose to US national security:
• Inherent  similarities between (a) 
underwater  penetration  of territorial 
waters and behaviors identical  to a  state-
sponsored prelude to war and (b) 
terrorist groups using similar methods. 
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• The possibility  that  terrorist groups use 
drug  terrorist  coalitions to gain  sources 
and methods that  can  be modified for 
t e r r o r i s t  a t t a c k s t h e n  p a s s t h i s 
informat ion  to another  terror is t 
organization  (i.e.,  LTTE sharing sea-
based methods,  including  suicide sea 
bombing techniques, with al-Qaeda). 
• The conditions that  enable  terrorist 
groups to gain  control  of an LPV, SPSS, or 
submarine capable of penetrating  US or 
allied territorial waters.  An  example of 
this is where a  terrorist group, which  has 
onsite access and operational knowledge, 
uses an  LTTE Sea Tigers terrorist  method 
and gains access to an  LPV,  SPSS, 
smuggling  torpedo,  or  submarine via 
hijacking  (while at  sea) or  sea  robbed 
(while in  the “harbor”) of the craft from 
the DTO.14 
IDENTIFYING DRUG TERRORIST 
BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS
During  the Cold War, intelligence agencies 
that  monitored and analyzed threat 
potentials had a  general sense of how  many 
Sino-Soviet Bloc sea  vessels (including 
submarines)  were produced each year,  dry-
docked for  repairs,  and operated at  sea. 
Conversely, US agencies do not know  the 
number  of smuggling  LPV  and SPSS,  or  the 
possible existence of submarines, in  the 
Pacific and Caribbean on  a  mission  at  any 
one time.  Also unknown  are the numbers of 
LPV and SPSS under  construction, produced, 
and ready  to be outfitted.  The calculations 
regarding  the possible size of the smuggling 
fleet is derived from  captured vessels. For 
example,  during  the past  three years, 
Colombia  has succeed in  intercepting  sixteen 
SPSS and LPV  in  the Pacific  on  courses 
toward Central America.15  During 2007, 
thirteen of the LPV were seized on  Colombian 
dry  land or  stopped at  sea. In  the first  six 
months of 2008, the US Coast  Guard and the 
US Navy detected forty-two LPV or SPSS. 16 
The general  behaviors of LPV  and SPSS at 
sea  are known.  A  small  but  notable number 
of LPV  and SPSS set  to sea  from  Ecuador, 
travel  around the Galapagos Islands and 
then, bearing on  a  northeast course, head to 
the coast  of Central  America.  Another  set, 
which  constitutes the majority  of the vessels, 
leaves South  America  and cruises to the east 
of the Galapagos,  bearing  north  to Central 
America.  A  third smuggling  fleet  leaves 
northern  Colombia, cruises north  along  the 
South  American  coastline,  and arrives in 
Honduras,  Guatemala,  and Belize.  A  fourth 
fleet leaves northern  Colombia  and cruises to 
Haiti,  Jamaica,  or  around the southeast of 
Cuba  and north  to the Florida  Keys.  Thus,  if 
an  applied behavioral  analysis indicates that 
DTO have fallen  into predictable behavior 
patterns such  as “always”  or  “usually,” 
mechanical detection  warning  devices can  be 
placed across the path  of the smuggling 
vessels.
United States and allied submarines in  the 
Pacific or  the Caribbean may  lie in  wait  to 
gather  information  (including  tracking  of 
LPV,  SPSS, or  submarines as they  leave the 
harbors) and run  on  a  finite range of course 
headings or  through  known  choke points 
such  as off the southeast  coast of Cuba or  the 
Galapagos Islands. These opportunities can 
be exploited,  as occurred during  the 
Caribbean  U-Boat  battles of World War II 
and the Cold War intelligence operations in 
the Atlantic and Caribbean. The authors 
acknowledge that  heavy  traffic  of LPV  and 
SPSS on  defined smuggling routes necessitate 
considering the possibility  that DTO will send 
submarines by  an  alternative route,  less 
defined and thus less monitored,  and along 
the littoral  zone to take full  advantage of its 
inherent poor  acoustics for  tracking 
submarines.
INDICATORS RELATED TO COMMAND 
AND CONTROL STRUCTURES 
South  American DTO employing  sea-based 
smuggling operations have developed 
command and control  structures with  loose 
and fixed polar  ends of a  continuum. The 
loose structure includes construction of LPV 
for  individuals or  coalitions of smugglers who 
pool their  money  and purchase a  single vessel 
for  smuggling operations for  which  they 
decide the departure time,  course, and crew. 
Highly  organized DTO encourage poorly 
organized independent  smugglers to operate 
in  an  area  targeted by  law  enforcement  and 
intelligence agencies in  a  classic strategy  that 
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is enormously  beneficial  to the DTO.  This is 
because the independent smugglers create a 
rich  target field for  interdiction  vessels to 
pursue and consequently  deplete intelligence 
and law  enforcement resources.  In  this 
strategy,  the highly  organized DTO attempts 
to gain  the advantage of its vessels, 
successfully  completing  the mission  using 
intell igence and counter-intell igence 
information  they  have gathered.  As predicted 
by  the Developmental Smuggling Model  (a 
model used to both  describe different 
smuggling  organizations and the strategies 
they  employ),  what  appears to be chaos,  in 
respect to the multiple smuggling  targets 
sighted in  the Pacific  and Caribbean,  fits into 
a  predictable transnational criminal 
smuggling strategy gestalt.17  
Fixed command and control structures 
construct  LPV,  SPSS, and submarines and 
determine for the fleet  when, where,  and how 
smuggling  vessels are sent to the Pacific and 
the Caribbean and how  captains and crews 
are to return to home base. Therefore, the 
authors put forth  as a  priority  the need to 
find indicators to identify  leaders and 
workers in the sea-based fixed smuggling 
command chain  and how  the leaders 
communicate while on  land, as well  as the 
communication  methods and secret  codes 
used to communicate with  sea-based 
smuggling  vessels.  Additionally,  identifying 
the number  of groups as well as nationalities 
of those involved in  each  LPV, SPSS,  and 
submarine des ign and construct ion 
illuminates possible intent of the vessel or 
boat and thus provides warring indicators. 
For  example, information  gathered from 
the 2011  Colombian  submarine construction 
indicates that  the supplies came from 
multinational sources such  as Russia,  China, 
and the United States,18  thus offering  a 
variety  of possible leads,  each of which  can  be 
traced back  to one command and control 
center. Information  derived from  local 
sources indicated the nationalities of 
individuals involved in  the design and 
construction, as well as their  probable ethnic 
backgrounds.  This information  may  include 
the locations where they  obtained the 
training experience and the contact with  the 
DTO necessary  to be recruited for  and 
participate in  such  a  project, as well  as who 
rented the facility  and the probable 
connection to the DTO. Technological 
indicators cannot gather  information alone 
and will require human information-
gathering methods.
INDICATORS RELATED TO SECRET 
CODES AND COMMUNICATION 
PATTERNS
At this time,  there is no evidence that  LPV  or 
SPSS, either in  the Pacific or  Caribbean,  are 
communicating with  each other  or  employing 
“wolf pack”  smuggling tactics such  as 
employing  a  lead vessel  or  boat  to scout for 
interdiction  ships and then signaling  others 
to avoid detection.19   However, during  one 
South  American  LPV  crew’s debriefing, the 
captain reported that  operations included 
radio communication  using  codes sent  and 
received from  different  locations at different 
times during  the smuggling mission. The first 
set  of communication  consisted of an LPV 
sending  a  transmission to Colombia as often 
as twice a  day  to verify  and correct  course, so 
that  each  vessel would arrive at  the correct 
time and location.  The second set  of 
communication  was sent to receivers within 
the targeted country.  When  the LPV  was at 
the rendezvous point, the targeted country’s 
criminal  organization sent the receiving  boats 
to meet  the LPV to off-load the drugs.20 Thus, 
it  appears,  at least  in  some circumstances, 
that  LPV had an  intersecting  communication 
pattern: Colombian  base to vessel, criminal 
group in  targeted country  such  as Panama  or 
Mexico to the vessel. It  is unknown  whether 
the Colombian base  was communicating  with 
the criminal  group using  the same radio 
frequency  and codes,  or  switching  to other 
methods such  as the Internet,  thereby 
creating a triangle communication pattern. 
INDICATORS RELATED TO VESSELS IN 
THE SOUTH AMERICAN FLEET: A 
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
An open-source review  of South  American 
DTO sea-based smuggling  strategy  indicates 
that  DTO have expanded their  surface 
smuggling  fleet  to include a  “silent service” 
consisting  of LPV  and SPSS.  Further,  DTO 
have made at least four  attempts to construct 
with  the intention  to launch  sophisticated 
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SPSS and submarines to the Pacific and one 
attempt to use an  SPSS to retrieve cargo off 
the coast  of Spain.  Comparison  between  the 
vessels and boats that  were in  the Sea  Tigers 
fleet and those belonging  to South  American 
DTO reveal that  the former consisted of 
logistic  craft,  attack  craft,  and suicide craft. 
Some vessels in  the Sea  Tiger  fleet  had special 
modifications,  such  as metal barbs on  the 
front  of the suicide boats to hook into the 
ship they  rammed prior to exploding, 
whereas such  vessels have not been  captured 
under the control of South American DTO. 21 
The capabilities of vessels in  the Sea 
Tiger’s navy  reflected a  different mission. For 
example,  in a manner  similar to Los Zetas 
(the Mexican-based DTO that  employs 
military  grade weapons and tactics to 
temporarily  control areas on  the United 
States-Mexico border  and protect  its 
smuggling  interests) the LTTE navy  was 
engaged in  ship protection  and temporary  sea 
control,  in  addition  to carrying  out  raids and 
delivering supplies.  Thus, there are 
similarities and differences between  the 
militarized capabilities of land and sea-based 
DTO.22 The authors searched for  documents 
listing  the types of vessels in  the South 
American  smuggling  fleet that  would either 
support  or  refute the premise that  South 
American DTO have built vessels with 
capabilities similar  to those of the Sea Tigers, 
such  as suicide craft  and armed fast  water 
craft.
A  classification system  that  described the 
various types of smuggling  craft  known  to 
have been  constructed and employed by 
South  American  DTO is provided in Table 1.23 
For  purposes of discussion,  the authors 
propose the addition of robotic submarines 
divided into two types: Type 1-C,  which  is a 
true submarine in  that  the entire vessel 
remains submerged except  when surfacing  to 
check  positioning or refuel,  similar  to the US 
Navy  Autonomous Underwater  Vehicles 
research  projects; and the second, Type 1-D, 
which  is an  SPSS controlled by  an  antenna 
that  remains above the water  line and is 
remotely piloted similar to a predator drone.
Smuggling Submarines, Torpedoes & Semi-submersibles
Classification System
Type Classification Propulsion Cost Number Dive Control Stealth
Type 1-A Submarine Self propulsion Millions Rare 65 feet to over 300 feet Excellent
Type 1-B Towed torpedo Towed Simple and cheap Several Depth set then towed Moderate 
Type 1-C*Torpedo robotic 
autonomous Electric $500,000 One Set by software Excellent
Ty p e 1 -
D*
Torpedo robotic
remote controlled Electric $500,000 One
Runs just  below 
surface Moderate-excellent
Type 2
Semi-submersible Self propulsion Complex and expensive
Only few 
captured
Ballasting down to 
lower its surface 
profile 
Moderate to excellent
control over its running 
depth but not fully 
submerging
Type 3 Low-profile vessels Self propulsion $250,000- 500,000 Many captured Boat designed to run awash 
Moderate minimize 
radar cross-section
*Authors propose new classification
Table 1: Smuggling Submarines, Torpedoes, and Semi-submersibles Classification System
INDICATORS RELATED TO SOUTH 
AMERICAN SMUGGLING FLEET 
DEVELOPMENT PHASE
The authors identify  three distinct  phases of 
development  for  smuggl ing  vessels: 
experimentation  through  trial and error 
(1992-2004); rapid prototyping  with 
increases in  capability  and use of SPSS 
(2005-2006); and the current  phase of 
mature designs and greater  standardization 
(2007-present).24 At  issue in  this paper  – in 
light of drug  terror group coalitions and rebel 
groups obtaining submarines – is whether 
South  American  smuggling  vessels will go 
into a next phase that entails capabilities that 
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could be used to attack  the US homeland or 
US interests abroad. A  possible alternative 
development phase for  smuggling  fleets is 
evident in  a  comparison  between  the South 
American  drug  smuggling fleet  and land-
based smuggling  vehicles used by  narco-
terrorist  groups operating  in  Mexico. In this 
comparison, the common  feature is the 
behavior  of DTO as they  exercise control over 
territory.  This comparison  raises the question 
of what conditions would be necessary  for 
example when  DTO attack each  other  to sink, 
steal loads or  are attacked by  pirates while at 
sea  for  South  American  sea-based smuggling 
organizations to morph into the militarized 
developmental  stage whereby  they  equip and 
operate sea vessels in  a  manner  similar to 
combat-equipped land-based smuggling 
vehicles recovered in Tamaulipas, a  northern 
border  state of Mexico in  2011. 25  This 
question  is examined in  greater  detail in  the 
threat assessment section of this article.
INDICATORS RELATED TO TRANSFER OF 
SMUGGLING TECHNOLOGY
Theories holding  that  advances in  smuggling 
strategies arise from  adaptation to detection 
methods hypothesized the existence of LPV 
and SPSS before any  were captured. These 
t h e o r i e s s u g g e s t e d t h a t s m u g g l i n g 
organizations would transform  go-fast  boats, 
hobbyist-built  submarine kits,  tourist 
submersible “submarines,”  or  submersibles 
found working ocean-based oil  rigs into craft 
that  adapted to the interdiction  pressure. 
Because an  LPV  or SPSS had not been 
captured, such  craft  were nicknamed “big 
foot”  in  reference to a  mythical creature 
rumored to exist but  not  captured. Since 
1992, when  “big foot”  vessels shifted from 
theory  to reality, observers discovered 
u n a n t i c i p a t e d l e a p s i n  s u b m a r i n e 
development due to transfer  of technology 
from  sources such as the Soviet  Union and 
former Soviet Republics (FSUR). 
The amount  of submarine technology 
transferred from  professional navies to drug 
terrorist  coalitions indicates that significant 
leaps forward in  smuggling  submarines’ 
capabilities must  be anticipated. For 
example,  although  arguments have been 
presented that the Ecuador  submarine was 
“crude”  (i.e., not  capable of diving  below 
sixty-five feet),  the counter argument  is that 
the submarine was constructed without 
unnecessary  expenditures – diving to that 
range effectively  neutralized thermal  imaging 
capabilities. The submarine’s efficient  design 
supplanted that  of the overwrought  Bogota 
2000  steel  double-hulled smuggling 
submarine design.  The Ecuador  submarine 
was covertly  constructed in  a  jungle, in  hope 
of avoiding the fate of the Cartagenita/
Facatativa Colombia  submarine (2000) that 
was detected while undergoing  construction 
in  the village of Cartagenita,  Colombia.  In 
addition,  the Timbiqui,  Colombia, smuggling 
submarine (2011)  was outfitted with essential 
technology  to enhance its anti-detection 
capabilities, demonstrating  that  the designers 
adapted to recent interdiction methods using 
thermal  imagery  detection  technology  on 
o v e r h e a d f l i g h t s . W i t h  r e s p e c t t o 
construction, the authors noted that  drug 
terrorist coalitions reverted to the prior 
strategy  in  that  the 2011  Colombian 
submarine was detected hidden in  a  jungle in 
the Timbiqui region.  
Although  LPV  have a  lower  upfront  cost, 
s m u g g l e r s m a y  r e a s o n a b l y  t u r n  t o 
submarines as a  cost-effective alternative, 
employing  leapfrog  advances gained from 
technology  transfers, requiring fewer total 
crew  members for  the “silent smuggling 
service,”  increasing  range and covert  mission 
time, and enabling round trips using  internal 
f u e l t a n k s . M o r e o v e r , p r o f e s s i o n a l 
submariners have been  trained and 
conditioned to spend months at  sea  operating 
complex machinery  and to remain  silent 
about  their  missions.  These professionals are 
available from  a  variety  of sources,  including 
FSUR. 26 Alternatively,  if DTO do not  want to 
rent an  FSUR captain  or  crew, Russia  is 
offering  submarine courses and training, 
including purchasing or  renting  submarines 
to a  number  of countries – India, Iran,  China, 
Poland, Romania,  Algeria, and Vietnam  – 
with  a  deal  to upgrade Venezuela’s old 
submarines. 27  The transfer  of technology 
through criminal- as opposed to state-
sponsored agreements must  also be 
considered.28 
Based on this reasoning,  South  American 
DTO inevitably  will exploit  technology 
transfers and training opportunities.  Thus,  it 
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would be beneficial  to know  which 
individuals from  South  America  attended 
submarine training  programs (in  such  places 
as the training center  in  Sosnovyy  Bor  near 
St.  Petersburg) and what,  if any, connections 
they  have to smuggling or  terrorist 
organizations.29 In many  respects, the FSUR 
submarine training programs are similar  to 
the flight school the 9/11  terrorists attended. 
Given  the technical assistance and transfer  of 
technology  from  the former  Soviet Union, 
smuggling  submarines now  have a  significant 
tactical advantage: once at  sea,  there may 
rendezvous with  cargo ships carrying  drugs 
and fuel far  away  from  traditional smuggling 
routes.  These vessels will  likely  have been 
purchased or  controlled by  a  DTO,  which 
would likely  provide a  command vessel 
disguised as a  trawler  for  insertion  of smaller 
manned or robotic submarines. 30 
Also, the smuggling submarine can  use 
professional submariners and thereby 
leapfrog ahead in  operational methods,  such 
as remaining submerged as it  approaches, 
off-loading within a  targeted country’s 
territorial waters,  or  moving into the littoral 
zone in  a  manner  similar  to an  SPSS. In 
terms of gaining tactical advantages,  the 
authors argue that  it is reasonable to 
anticipate that  DTO will upgrade as the 
technology  is obtained from  the Type 1-B 
torpedo to the Type 1-C or  Type 1-D. Finally, 
the authors posit  that just  as submarine 
technology  was transferred from  DTO based 
in  South  America  to others based in  Southern 
Europe,  DTO will transfer  the Type 1-C and 
Type 1-D technology  to African- and 
European-based enterprises as well  as to 
terrorist groups.
INDICATORS OF CHANGE IN SMUGGLING 
FLEET STRATEGY
Go-fast  vessels continue to represent 40  to 
almost 50 percent of trafficking in  the 
maritime environment, however,  there has 
been  a  decline in  the use of LPV  and SPSS 
after  they  peaked in  2008. 31 A  critical factor 
in  this decline was the arrest of key  criminals 
by  employing  the Maritime Strategic 
Doctrine (i.e.,  Operation  Panama Express, 
the multiagency  organized crime drug 
enforcement  task force). The arrest of 
Colombian national  Enrique Portocarrero 
(nicknamed Captain Nemo) was key  because 
it  was reported that  he was the principal 
builder of about a  third of the LPV  in  2003, 
although  where the plans came from  is still 
not clear. 32 The arrest  in  Argentina of Ignacio 
Alvarez Meyendorff, one of the  main 
organizers of a  DTO submarine building 
operation, reflected the pressure applied 
through  the Maritime Strategic Doctrine.  The 
suspect, also known as “Old Man”  and “Big 
Brother,”  was identified as working for  the 
Colombian  Norte del Valle drug  cartel. It’s 
believed that  Meyendorff was tracked down 
via  information  obtained by  the US Office of 
Naval Intelligence and the Drug Enforcement 
Agency.33  Many  other factors could account 
for  the decrease of smuggling  craft spotted at 
sea:
• Limited number  of craftsmen, such  as 
Portocarrero, with  the dry-dock skills to 
build vessels.  Even if the drug  traffickers 
are able to mass-produce vessels, the 
arrest  of that one builder  has a  profound 
impact on the construction rate.
• Drug  traffickers reverting  to go-fast  boats 
with  advancements in  packaging  that 
adjust for  shifting  fuel and cargo loads 
while at sea.
• Smuggling vessels navigating within  the 
territorial waters of each  country  as they 
travel  north  with  the goal of avoiding 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  w a t e r s w h e r e t h e 
multinational drug  interdiction  forces are 
most likely to patrol.
• Recent  attempts by  the Colombian 
government  to control the availability  of 
fiberglass used to construct the LPV.34 
• Appe al o f succe ss fu l  land-base d 
smuggling  methods such  as tunnels that 
transport multiple contraband. 35   
• Discovery  of construction sites, thus 
shifting DTO strategy  back to land and air 
methods. 
• Decrease in the availably  of LPV and 
SPSS captains and crews.
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INDICATORS RELATED TO 
CONSTRUCTION WORKERS, CAPTAINS, 
AND CREWS
Available information  indicates that  LPV  in 
the Pacific and the Caribbean are piloted and 
crewed by  Colombian  nationals,  with  notable 
exceptions.  For example, during  Operation 
Panama Express, a  smuggling  vessel 
interdicted off the coast  of Costa  Rica  had 
among  its crew  four men: two Colombians, a 
Guatemalan, and a  Sri Lankan  Tamil, who 
claimed that  he was a  resident alien of 
Colombia. 36 However, as of yet,  there are no 
open  source documents that  indicate the 
nationality,  training,  and recruitment  of any 
of the submariners who would have crewed 
either  the Colombian or  Ecuadorian  SPSS or 
submarines.  
LPV sent to sea  from  organizations with 
fixed command and control  structures consist 
of a  captain, two or  three crew  members who 
work  in  twelve-hour  shifts, and an  enforcer, 
as described by  one LPV  captain  who talked 
to a  news reporter. Somewhat  analogous to a 
Russian political  commissar  or  politruk, the 
drug  enforcer’s loyalty  is to the DTO and not 
to the captain  and crew. In contrast  to the 
political commissar  of the USSR, the drug 
commissar  aboard an  LPV  has the authority 
to countermand the sea  captain’s orders and, 
as such, is responsible for  maintaining crew 
discipline with  authorization to use lethal 
force. Moreover,  the LPV commissar  is the 
individual who informs the LPV  captain  of 
the course and rendezvous point  after  the 
LPV has been towed to sea  and cut  loose. 
Available information  regarding  LPV 
captains suggests that  they  may  be licensed 
sea  captains,  may  have successfully 
completed smuggling  runs on surface  vessels, 
may  have completed previous LPV  missions, 
and may  have knowledge through  prior 
experience of avoiding  the targeted countries’ 
radar and sonar.37 
DRUG TRAFFICKING VESSEL 
INTERDICTION ACT: DEBRIEFING 
CAPTAINS AND CREWS
With  the passing  of the Drug  Trafficking 
Vessel Interdiction  Act  (DTVIA), LPV  and 
SPSS captains and crew  can  be arrested and 
prosecuted even  after  they  have scuttled the 
vessel.  The opportunity  to debrief captains 
and crews provides opportunities to gather 
detailed information  regarding  all  the events 
from  their  recruitment to arrest,  which  can  be 
used to develop a quick interdiction  response. 
There is little  open  source information about 
crew  members, but what is known  suggests 
that use of submarines implies military 
training.27
The case of Enrique Portocarrero serves as 
an  example of how  to capitalize on  the arrest 
of sea  smugglers and demonstrates the 
importance of analyzing  each individual’s 
background.  Portocarrero led a  double life as 
a  shrimp fisherman  in  Buenaventura, 
Colombia,  and has been  credited as the 
creator of LPV, having designed and 
constructed, in  a  mangrove swamp twenty 
miles south  of the city, as many  as twenty 
fiberglass Type 3  vessels. Each  LPV was a 
custom  design  detailed to the specifications 
of the packaging  and weight of the cargo to be 
smuggled – thus the variations inherent in 
Portocarrero vessels, from  Buenaventura  in 
South  America  to Central America  and 
Mexico. The Type 3  construction  included 
innovations such  as a  bow  that  produced very 
little wake, a  conning tower  that raised only  a 
foot above the water  (implied Type 2  SPSS), 
and a  valve system  that enabled the crew  to 
scuttle the SPSS or LPV in  ten  minutes. 
Portocarrero developed a  signature design: a 
sleek  V-shaped hull,  a  sturdy  keel, and an 
exhaust  system  that reduced the thermal 
image. At the time of his arrest,  Portocarrero 
had $200,000  hidden in  the spare tire of his 
car.  He had invested his reputed $1  million 
per-vessel  fees to purchase five shrimp boats. 
The extent  to which  the shrimp boats served 
as tenors or spotters is unknown. 38  
Captured crew  members refer to LPV  as 
floating  coffins.  The authors surmise that this 
reference illustrates the drop-off of potential 
crew  members willing to make more than one 
trip.  An additional  problem  for  smugglers is 
that  the effectiveness of LPV  stealth 
measures, such  as running diesel smoke 
underwater  and shielding  hot engines with 
lead pads to avoid detection, is limited by  the 
crafts’ structure.39  The authors propose that 
these factors, weighed against  the inherent 
positive factor  of the covert nature of 
smuggling  submarines capable of operating 
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in  the littoral zone and the transfer  of 
technology  and engineering  capability  from 
FSUR,  make the smuggling  submarine an 
attractive alternative and natural  progression 
from  the LPV.  Thus,  similar to the hypothesis 
regarding  a  “big foot”  progression  from  go-
fast  boats to LPV,  once the leapfrog  in 
technology  and operational  skill is included, 
the authors support  the  likelihood of a 
progression  from  LPV  to smuggling 
submarines.  The capture of the sophisticated 
SPSS and smuggling submarines in  Colombia 
in  2000, Ecuador  in  2010, and Colombia  in 
2011  (with  the 2010 and 2011  discoveries 
occurring  within  eight months of each  other) 
is worthy  of concern  when placed on  a time 
line.  The probability  that  drug  terrorist 
coalitions are engaged in  multiple ongoing 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d S P S S a n d s u b m a r i n e 
construction projects should be considered.  
TRANSFER OF SMUGGLING 
TECHNOLOGY: THE CASE OF THE 
ENGINEER FROM SPAIN
Inferences that DTO intend to expand LPV, 
SPSS torpedoes, and submarine operations to 
the Atlantic have been  voiced. 40 The strategic 
advantages of employing covert measures, 
rather  than speed alone in  smuggling 
operations,  especially  across vast  distances, 
have been understood for some time. “When 
speed no longer  won the day,  traffickers,  to 
avoid detection, turned to parasitic devices 
on  the bottom  of ship hulls,  towed array 
devices and ultimately  LPV  and semi-
submersible boats.” 41  It  is surmised that 
technology  from  South  American DTO will 
appear  in  Africa  and Southern  Europe, and 
there is speculation  that  the FARC will  use 
Brazil to move drugs to these regions.42
Such conjecture  is founded on  the belief 
that  Type 1-B torpedoes and Type 3  vessels 
have been  interdicted while being  towed by  a 
larger  ship off the coasts of Africa  and 
Southern Europe. The authors were unable to 
locate any  news or  government reports of 
LPV,  SPSS,  or  submarines off the coast of 
Africa. However, LPV and SPSS are reported 
to have been  found in  Spain and Sri  Lanka, 
raising  the issue of the vessels’ origins.43 The 
Office  of Naval Intelligence team  calculated 
that  the Ecuador  submarine had a  range (on 
internal fuel) of about  12,000 kilometers, 
which  supports the position that  DTO have 
achieved the technical  ability  to construct a 
boat  that  could launch  from  the east  coast of 
South  America, cruise the Atlantic,  and reach 
Africa  and possibly  Southern Europe or, 
alternatively,  leave the west  coast of South 
America  and reach  into the United States.44 
The authors searched newspapers and 
government  documents in  South  America, 
Africa,  and Southern  Europe to locate 
documented cases of successful  LPV, 
submersible, or  submarine transatlantic 
smuggling  operations originating  from  the 
east  coast of South  America. The authors 
could locate stories that speculated that an 
SPSS Type 2  vessel had crossed the Atlantic. 
However,  they  could not  find any  evidence 
that  submarines Type 1-A  or  SPSS Type 3  had 
either  been  towed or  had cruised from  South 
America  to the coast  of Africa  or  Southern 
Europe.  
The search  indicated that  in  2006  the 
Spanish  Civil  Guard followed up on  a 
telephone tip  and found what  they  reported 
as a  Type 2  SPSS, which  contained no drugs, 
in  an  inlet  near  the Atlantic in Spain’s 
northwestern  Galicia  coastal region. 45  There 
was no indication  that  either  an  SPSS or 
submarine had been  towed from  South 
America to the African or Spanish coastline.
Further  searches of Spanish  documents 
indicated that  in 2009,  during  the beginning 
of the legal  case regarding  the captured 
smuggling  SPSS in  Spain, Spanish  media 
reported that  Manuel Clemente, alias “The 
Engineer,”  built  a  nine-meter  Type 2  SPSS in 
his garden  shed at  his home in  Galicia. The 
SPSS was discovered by  police empty  of 
drugs but  with  its motor  running, afloat  off 
the coast  of northwest Spain.  It had room  for 
one person, who received oxygen  from  a pipe 
that  stuck  up above the surface, fitting  the 
description of a  Type 2  SPSS. The smuggling 
method entailed Clemente accompanying  the 
SPSS to a rendezvous point  off the Spanish 
coast in  a  yacht. Clemente’s only  avoidance 
tactics were scanning  the horizon  for  patrol 
boats. His intent  was to meet the Colombian 
boat  containing the cargo, load the drugs, and 
then  travel to the Spanish  coast. Clemente 
reported that a  Colombian  drug  cartel had 
paid €100,000 for  the SPSS to be built  in  the 
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hope that  it  could imitate the success of 
similar SPSS. 
The case of the Spanish  engineer  points up 
four  crucial  concepts in  the development of 
indicators for sea-based smuggling. First, 
with respect  to the transfer from  one 
continent to another  of SPSS smuggling 
technology  by  a  criminal enterprise, 
Clemente alleged he received the blueprint 
for  constructing the SPSS from  a  Colombian 
DTO. Second, Clemente reported that  the 
man hired to pilot  the SPSS jumped ship 
when  it began  to behave erratically  on its first 
mission. Clemente then  made sure the SPSS 
was discovered so he could tell the 
Colombians he had been  the victim  of a  police 
raid rather than  explain  to the Colombians 
that  the SPSS did not function  as expected or 
that  the pilot  abandoned the vessel. The 
authors also note the difficulty  Clemente 
experienced recruiting  a  pilot  with  the skill 
and knowledge to handle the smuggling 
vessel.  It  is unknown  whether the blueprints 
for  the SPSS were based on  a  design  for 
operations in  the littoral zone on  the west and 
north  coasts of Colombia  and thus had flaws 
that  impeded the vessel’s operation in  the 
littoral zone in Spain. 
Third, with respect  to the difficulty  in 
constructing the vessel and transporting  it to 
the sea, the police did not need to be told 
about  the vessel because they  had been 
tailing  Clemente after  spotting his SPSS 
during  one of their  many  trips to the local 
docks.  The difficulty  Clemente experienced 
while trying  to build a  sea smuggling  vessel, 
along  with  the problem  of how  to get  the 
vessel  to the sea,  is universal  in  that 
smuggling  vessels built  in Colombia  and 
Ecuador  face similar  difficulty  in avoiding 
detection. Thus, the construction  of the 
vessel, transportation  to sea, possible 
reassembly  of the vessel  prior  to launch, as 
well  as the specifics of launching  the vessel, 
present  discreet phases for  evaluation  from  a 
s t r a t e g i c  w a r n i n g p e r s p e c t i v e . T h e 
importance of gathering  land-based 
intelligence during  any  one of the these 
distinct  phases is similar  to the type of 
intelligence gathered about submarines from 
the Sino-Soviet Bloc in  the modified Ramsey 
and Borner  model.  This may  include any 
offensive capabilities – internal or  external 
torpedoes, mine laying  apparatus, and diver 
lockout  chambers – that  a  smuggling 
submarine might possess. 
Another  important  indicator  in  the case of 
the engineer  from  Spain  is the importance of 
geography  in  developing strategic  threat 
assessments about  where (what  type of 
littoral zone and sea conditions)  and when 
(daylight  versus nighttime) smuggling  craft 
are launched. If specific times and locations 
are known, space-based data  collection 
platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, or 
reconnaissance aircraft  can  be employed to 
support  human  intelligence collection efforts. 
One source opined,  based on an  analysis of 
Clemente’s vessel, that it  was not  closely 
related to the Colombian subs in  design.  For 
example,  the vessel was made from  steel,  had 
ballast tanks on  the flanks, and used separate 
propellers for the diesel (main) and electric 
drive.  This critic of the Spanish  SPSS 
concluded that  the craft  was likely  intended 
for  short  transits between  the cargo ship and 
shore and not  for  long  Atlantic Ocean 
cruises. 46  The authors observe that  steel 
rather  than fiberglass has been found in 
Colombian  constructed LPV.  Thus, a hull 
other than fiberglass may  not  be a  telltale 
sign of the origin of design origin. 
INDICATORS DERIVED FROM LOCATION 
OF CONSTRUCTION SITES
The Soviet  Union’s hidden  submarine base at 
Balaklava – carved in  rock and offering sea 
and bay  entrances that  submarines could use 
while remaining submerged – was similar  to 
South  American  DTO facilities in  specific 
geographic areas under  the control of the 
FARC,  which  offer  specific advantages for 
covert operation. The South  American  DTO 
use the triple jungle tree canopy  that blocks 
or  retards satellite penetration  to cover  their 
behaviors and intentions. There has been  one 
attempt to use a metal-covered construction 
building  in  a  remote location. Thus, two 
factors assist in  narrowing  the area  to be 
searched. The first  is that  the areas are under 
the control  of the FARC and secondly, the 
areas shield the construction from  overhead 
surveillance. Analysis of the Sea  Tigers 
construction  sites is instructive because the 
group had deve loped boat-bui ld ing 
“shipyards”  and a  system  by  which  the vessels 
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would be taken  by  trailer  to a  launching  site, 
complete a  mission,  placed back on  a  trailer, 
and hidden  again  in  the jungle. The authors 
note that construction  of a  submarine, 
possibly  by  an  independent  enterprise 
outside of those protected by  the FARC but 
within  an  area  where a  variety  of rebel groups 
resided, was discovered in 2000 in Colombia.
FORMER SOVIET UNION’S 
DISTRIBUTION OF LITTORAL 
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE TECHNOLOGY
The 1992  Navy  and Marine Corps White 
Paper  “...From  the Sea”  and its follow-on 
“Forward...From  the Sea”  (1995)  recognized 
the dissolution  of the USSR and the end of 
the Cold War  (1989-1991) and logically 
predicted the increased importance of the 
littoral battle space.47  However,  the white 
paper understandably  did not foresee the rise 
of the drug  terrorist coalitions’ blatant 
development of smuggling  submarines, rebel 
groups constructing  their  own  submarines, or 
the USSR or  FSUR selling or  leasing 
submarines and/or  crews and providing 
training facilities for anyone who wishes to 
acquire the knowledge and skill to pilot  a 
military  grade submarine.  It  is reasonable 
t h a t a s t u t e i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d 
counterintelligence officers were not 
surprised to learn  that the power  vacuum 
resulting  from  the readjustment  of sea 
warfare policies of the two great navies of the 
world would be filled by  transnational crime 
and terrorist groups. 
A  further  outcome was that  Ludwig 
Fainberg, a.k.a. “Tarzan,”  proposed a  deal  to 
sell a  Tango class diesel-powered patrol 
submarine to move cocaine from  Colombia  to 
the coast of California with  the plan  that 
drugs, packed into capsules attached to 
buoys ,  would be f i red through  the 
submarine’s torpedo tubes and float at sea 
until  speedboats made the pickup. 48  The 
submarine was based in  Kronshtadt,  a  large 
Russian  submarine base on  the Gulf of 
Finland,  off St.  Petersburg.  During the 
negotiations, the price of the submarine, 
which  included a crew  of twenty  for  a year, 
dropped from  $9  million to $5  million. The 
deal fell through  when  the Colombians 
backed out,  apparently  feeling such  an 
enterprise was too ambitious. 49  Ludwig 
Fainberg  was also accused of trying  to sell 
eight  Mi-8  military  helicopters.  What is 
notable about Fainberg’s failed logic  was the 
assumption  that  a  Russian  Tango class 
submarine could repeatedly  fire torpedoes off 
the coast  of the United States without having 
been  trailed to the area  or  that the noise of 
the multiple torpedo launches would go 
undetected or ignored.50 The authors deduce 
that  the DTO reasoned that operating  a 
military  grade submarine off the coast  of the 
United States was inviting  a military  rather 
than  a law  enforcement response,  thus 
inviting a disaster. 
SOUTH AMERICAN DRUG TRAFFICKERS’ 
AVOIDANCE OF MILITARIZATION
A  review  of smuggling  vessels discovered in 
South  America  shows that none of the 
designs include torpedoes, mine laying 
features, diver  lockout  chambers, or  armor 
plating. The avoidance of militarization  of the 
LPV,  SPSS, and submarines is a  significant 
indicator.  The authors argue that  detection of 
any  one of the four  features in  smuggling 
submarine armor  –plating, weapons (e.g., 
either  internal or  external torpedo systems, 
etc.),  diver  lock out, or  mine laying 
capabilities – would be a  significant indicator 
and signal  a  profound shift  in  DTO 
intentions.  Given  the expense of constructing 
a  submarine,  it appears unlikely  that  using 
one as an explosive would be a  reasonable 
cost-effective means to strike at an  enemy. 
Potential  vessels in  the smuggling  fleet that 
could reasonably  be modified for  littoral 
warfare are Type 1-C and Type 1-D,  as well  as 
Type 3 vessels.  
The general consensus that robotic  Type 1-
C and Type 1-D submarines were too 
unpredictable  to be used by  smuggling 
organizations was rejected by  the findings 
from  Operation  Panama Express. The 
operation  identified three men, Gustavo 
Garcia-Velasquez,  Lope Lopez-Ortega, and 
Carlos Vera,  each  with  their  own  specialty: an 
electrician,  a  fiberglass fabricator,  and a 
facilitator  who arranged meetings between 
remote controlled submarine makers and 
potential buyers.  The three men  pleaded 
guilty  in  US District  Court in  Tampa, Florida, 
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in  a  conspiracy  that goes back  to 1997. “The 
remote-controlled vessels — up to 40 feet 
long  — are smaller  than the manned SPSS, 
which  are up to 70  feet  long,”  said Joseph 
Ruddy,  an  assistant  US attorney.  “The 
remote-controlled vessels can  carry  up to 
1,800 kilograms of cocaine and cost  about 
$500,000 to make,  according  to court 
documents.  They  have a  range of about  1,000 
miles without  refueling,  but  they  can  be 
refueled at sea.” 51 
UNITED STATES NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS 
IN LITTORAL OPERATIONS: LESSONS 
LEARNED 
Since 2000, there have been  three attacks on 
US Navy  ships. On  January  3, 2000,  there 
was a  failed attacked by  al-Qaeda using a  boat 
full of explosives against the Navy  destroyer 
USS The Sullivans, while in  port  at  Aden, 
Yemen.  On October  12,  2000, there was a 
successful  attack on  the destroyer USS Cole 
while it was harbored and refueling  in  port  at 
Aden. Both  attacks used small surface 
vessels.  Analysis of transfer  of sea-based 
smuggling  technology  and applied behavioral 
analysis of sea-based terrorist  actions 
suggests a  link between  the LTEE and the al-
Qaeda attacks in  2000.  Specifically,  the LTTE 
suicide attacks at sea  are also said to have 
inspired other groups, including al-Qaeda. 
Sea Tigers often  boast  that  it  was their  suicide 
attacks on Sri  Lankan vessels, the Abitha  and 
Edithara,  that al-Qaeda  emulated when  it 
attacked the USS Cole. 52
As a result  of the USS Cole bombing, the 
US Navy  began  to reassess its antiterrorism 
and force-protection  policy  and methods, 
both  at  home and abroad.  The Navy  stepped 
up Random  Anti-terrorism  Measures (RAM), 
which  are meant  to complicate the planning 
of a  terrorist  attack by  making  it  difficult to 
discern a  predictable pattern  to security 
posture. 53  The Abdullah  Azzam  Brigades 
claimed responsibility  for  firing at  least  three 
rockets at  a  US amphibious assault  ship while 
two ships,  the Ashland and the USS 
Kearsarge,  were docked at Aqaba, a 
Jordanian port  on  the Red Sea, in  2005.54 
Two of the rockets were Katyushas, highly 
inaccurate, unguided weapons used by 
Lebanon’s Hezbollah  guerrillas to attack 
northern  Israel.  There have been  a  number of 
ships, such  as The Liberty  Sun,  flying  an 
American  flag  while carrying  food aid for 
CARE and the World Food Program  that 
were attacked by  Somali pirates in  2005,  and 
the number is likely to continue to rise. 
RECENT ATTACK OF A NAVY SHIP BY A 
SMALL SUBMARINE
The question  of whether  a  mini-sub (which 
the Sea Tigers had in  their  terrorist 
smuggling  fleet) has been  used to attack a 
navy  ship since 1941  was answered in  the 
af f irmative when  the South  Korean 
government  announced that  a  60-foot  North 
Korean  Yeono class (or  alternative spelling 
“Yono”) submarine fired a  torpedo that  sank 
the South  Korean corvette Cheonan  in  March 
2010.55 South  Korea also declared that North 
Korea had a larger  midget  submarine,  the 
Sang-O, on  patrol in  the area  when  the Yeono 
class mini-submarine attacked the South 
Korean  ship.56  As proof of the attack,  South 
Korea announced that a  civilian  ship hired to 
dredge the area  of the attack  found remains 
of what  South  Korea  classified as a CHT-02D 
torpedo, made in North Korea. 
That  torpedo would have a  big  enough 
warhead, 250  kilograms,  to destroy  the 
corvette.  Vice-Admiral Hwang  Won-dong, 
who led the intelligence analysis unit of the 
investigation team,  reported that after  the 
provocation, the submarine “promptly 
returned to waters north  of the Northern 
Limit  Line (NLL) by  back  tracking  the 
infiltration route.” The vice admiral reported,
We do not know whether  the North 
observed the Cheonan  in  advance to attack 
it. But we believe that North  Korean 
submarines must have undergone prior 
military drills, including firing a torpedo, in 
waters similar  to those in which  the South’s 
frigate was sunk. We detected that a few 
small submarines and a  mother ship 
supporting them  left a  North  Korean naval 
base in the West Sea 2-3 days prior to the 
attack. “No. 1,” a handwritten mark on the 
rear part of the torpedo collected from the 
sinking site, is  consistent with  markings on 
a stray North  Korean torpedo the South 
recovered seven years ago.57 
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Government reports state that the ship’s 
sonar  did not  detect the submarine or  the 
torpedo.58  
DIRECT ACTION AGAINST COMMAND 
AND CONTROL
Unlike the command and control of the Sino-
Soviet  Bloc analyzed in  the Ramsey  and 
Borner model,  current authorities are 
working  to remove DTO leadership. Law 
enforcement  efforts to identify  and arrest 
members involved in  sea-based smuggling 
conspiracies — from  fabricators to leadership 
of DTO through  Operation  Panama  Express 
and specifically  those involved in  LPV,  SPSS, 
and submarine operations — will, over  time, 
have an  impact  on  DTO sea  operations using 
LPV,  SPSS, and submarines. Moreover, if 
key,  difficult-to-replace smuggling fleet 
strategists,  such  as Meyendorff, are arrested, 
it  follows that  until the strategists can  be 
replaced, there  is a  deficit in the ability  of the 
DTO to respond to constant changes and 
advances in  interdiction sources and 
methods. In  the event  that  the DTO engage in 
terrorism, the issues emerge of the impact of 
removal of DTO leadership by  military 
capture or kill methods.
A  critical observation  is what  occurred to 
the Sea Tigers who were confronted by  a 
military  response,  in  large part  due to the 
terrorism  of the land-based operations. 
Specifically, the death  in  April 2009  of 
Colonel Soosai,  a  key  leader  in  the LTEE and 
referred to as the Admiral  of the Sea  Tigers, 
b r o u g h t a n  i m m e d i a t e e n d t o t h e 
independent  Tamil state civil  war  and thus 
the Sea  Tigers’ sea-based smuggling and 
terrorist  operations.  His death preceded that 
of Velupillai Prabhakaran,  the leader  and 
founder  of the LTEE, killed in  fighting  with 
the army  on  May  18,  2009. The deaths of 
Colonel Soosai and Prabhakaran,  the 
remaining command and control structure 
during  military  operations,  and the demise of 
the LTEE raise the issue of the longevity  of 
terrorist  organizations that use sea-based 
terrorism  once the leadership is removed by  a 
military  response that is absolute and final. 
These issues also prompt  a comparison  to the 
demise of about  50 percent of the FARC 
membership and whether  the FARC has the 
leadership capability  to construct  and operate 
a smuggling terrorist fleet. 59  
THE MODIFIED RAMSEY AND 
BORNER MODEL
The Ramsey  and Borner  method of applied 
behavioral analysis for  identifying  indicators 
and formulating  strategic warnings regarding 
the Sino-Soviet Bloc was appropriate at  the 
time, given the geopolitical complexities of 
the waxing  and waning relationships among 
the members of the Sino-Bloc  prior  to the 
collapse of the Soviet  Union. The method 
remains relevant given the similar state of 
relationships among members in  the drug 
trafficking terrorist coalition today. 
In  a  similar  vein, both  DTO and rebel 
groups proclaim  political doctrine that  is 
diametrically  opposed to their  behavior.   In 
the case of the drug traffickers,  the 
pronouncements that  they  are nonpolitical 
and interested only  in profit does not  match 
their  behaviors of controlling  the government 
through  intimidation, bribes, assassination 
and terrorist  acts.  The rebel groups’ 
pronouncements – that  they  are political  and 
not profit-driven and want to change the 
government  through  intimidation, bribes, 
assassination,  and terrorist acts – do not 
match  their  participation  in  drug trafficking. 
Both  groups seek  to dominate specific areas 
of the world to satisfy  their  own wants and 
what  drives the tension  is that  both  groups 
need to control the political  process in  their 
countries by  similar methods. As the drug 
organizations and the terrorist groups strive 
to control the government  and compete 
against each other  for resources,  the 
distinctions between them  blur,  especially 
when there is a coalition.  
The contradiction  between  alleged belief 
and behavior must  be analyzed within the 
geopolitical  context of the region  when 
completing  threat assessment, exercising  risk 
management,  and formulating policy 
decisions.  At times,  there is shifting  on the 
crime-terror  nexus within  and among the 
three different group clusters — drug  terrorist 
coalitions, DTO, and terrorist/rebel groups — 
with  such  speed that  separation  of terrorist 
from  criminal becomes blurred.60  The 
shifting  dynamic within  and among  the 
LICHTENWALD, STEINHOUR, & PERRI, MARITIME THREAT  14
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 13 (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
different  members of the drug  terrorist 
coalition  complicates the identification of 
indicators and generation  of strategic 
warnings.  The threat  analysis of a  potential 
attack  on the United States is juxtaposed over 
the three competing  groups: drug terrorist 
coalitions, DTO, and terrorist groups. Unlike 
the Ramsey  and Borner  model,  which 
considered one command and control 
structure, the South America  threat 
assessment  must  consider  these three 
separate command and control structures. 
Within this juxtaposed template laid over 
the Ramsey  and Borner  model is the 
possibility  that for-profit terrorist groups, 
such  as Hezbollah  operations in  South 
America, may  advance from  a  profit-
generating smuggling  mission to carrying out 
a  political mission,  either directly  or  in  a 
scenario similar  to Abdullah  Azzam  Brigades’ 
rocket  attack. Alternatively,  the possibility 
that  the  FARC may  advance to sea-based 
smuggling for  profit  must  be calculated. 
Furthermore,  the possibility  that  a  drug 
trafficking  organization  may  decide to engage 
in  terrorist  attacks against a  Coast Guard 
vessel  or  land-based police  force must be 
considered. As a  means of organizing the 
above waxing  and waning  factors,  as well  as 
organizations’ proclaimed political doctrine 
that is diametrically  opposed to their 
behavior,  the authors offer  the HCR-20,  a 
forensic  behavioral science method of threat 
assessment that  divides hostile intentions 
and behaviors into historical, clinical, and 
risk management components. 61  
The historical  component  is the collection 
of the behaviors that  have occurred in  the 
past  and are fixed.  For  example, al-Qaeda, 
Hezbollah  (through  the Abdullah  Azzam 
B r i g a d e s ) ,  a n d t h e S e a  T i g e r s a l l 
demonstrated a  history  of sea-based 
terrorism. The Sea  Tigers proclaimed their 
intentions to kill  Sri Lankans and other 
nationals and did so during sea-based 
terrorist  acts. Thus, these organizations had a 
history  of terrorism, reported they  believed in 
committing  terrorist  acts,  and therefore only 
needed the opportunity  and means to commit 
the terrorist  acts.  With  respect to the South 
American  DTO, there has been no stated goal 
of killing Americans or  their  allies using sea-
based terrorist  operations. However, using  a 
behavioral  science threat perspective 
historically, the behaviors of DTO in  North 
Central  and South America  have repeatedly 
demonstrated acts using  military  and 
terrorist strategies and tactics. 
The clinical  section of the threat 
assessment includes the contradiction 
between  alleged belief and behavior  or 
intentions. In  the case of al-Qaeda  and 
Hezbollah  and Abdullah  Azzam  Brigades, 
there is no discrepancy  between  intentions 
and behaviors inasmuch  as both  claimed 
their  intentions to kill  Americans.  The clinical 
assessment addresses what  would need to 
change for  South American DTO or  the FARC 
to engage in  sea-based terrorist attacks. 
Given  that the DTO and the FARC have 
engaged in land-based terrorism  — the 
former  in  North  and Central  America  and the 
latter  in South  America  — the issue for  threat 
analysis is identifying  which  factors caused a 
change in  the belief that  sea-based terrorist 
acts would be in  the best  interest  of the 
organization.   
Applying threat assessment methods to 
DTO,  narco-terrorists, and terrorist 
organizations using  a behavioral  science 
assessment of hostile actions calls for  a  third 
component, known as risk management, 
which  considers the availability  of tools for 
behaving  in a  manner  consistent with  a 
group’s belief system.  For  example, 
equipping go-fast  boats with  barbs on  the 
bow  would not  be consistent  with  a 
smuggling  terrorist  group’s stated beliefs that 
it  is only  intending  to engage in  smuggling 
operations.  Thus, although  a DTO,  such  as 
the Colombian  Norte del  Valle,  may  report 
that  it  has no intention to engage in  sea-
based terrorism,  its history  refutes that 
assertion, and the collection  of tools such  as 
outfitting  or  equipping  smuggling  craft with 
terrorist  capabilities also refutes that 
assertion, therefore raising  the strategic 
threat warning.
The following  threat  matrix  draws upon 
the authors’ collection of information  about 
sea-based smuggling  crews,  captains, 
communication  patterns, avoidance tactics, 
technology, and strategic  planners.  The 
matrix  also includes the structural advances 
in  vessels and boats and whether  the 
advances were similar  or  different  from  those 
used by  military  or terrorist  organizations 
with  sea-based capabilities. To address the 
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risk management  component  of the HCR-20 
and in  keeping  with the Ramsey  and Borner 
Model,  a  threat matrix  is presented below 
that  includes the information  about  sea-
based smuggling operations without  terrorist 
intentions or  preparations and terrorist  sea 
operations that  had specific terrorist 
intentions and preparations. In  a  manner 
similar  to the Ramsey  and Borner  Model, 
different types of sea-based hostile actions 
that  can  take place and the different types of 
hostile behaviors that raise the potential  for 
hostile action are offered.
Indicators 1 2 3 4
Section A: Leadership and Crew
Loose—no command and control structure
All crew agree to smuggling drugs—no political affiliation X
Loose—no command and control structure
All crew agree to smuggle drugs; political affiliation among crew X X
Tight command and control structure
All crew agree to smuggling drugs; no political affiliation X
Tight command and control structure; all crew agree to smuggling; political affiliation with command staff X X
Section B: Financing of Construction
Drug trafficking organization X
Coalition of drug traffickers who commissioned the boat X
Terrorist organization X X
Coalition of drug traffickers and terrorists X X
Section C: Weapons 
Release of controlled weapons and equipment to crew—grenade launchers x
Release of controlled weapons and equipment to crew—assault weapons X
Limited automatic weapons on board—one firearm to drug commissar X
Crew military trained X X
Captain military trained X X
Section D: submarine vessel construction
Vessel outfitted—armor plating X X X
Vessel outfitted—deck gun X X X
Vessel outfitted—explosives X X X
Diver lock out X X
Mine laying ability X X
Stealth avoidance only X X
Section E: Course of vessel submarine, torpedo, low profile 
Military installations X X
Military ships in harbor X
Fixed target of civilian opportunity—oil rigs X
Fixed target of civilian opportunity—oil carrying vessels, etc.  (time of shipping on same course) X
Course avoids military installations X X
Course avoids civilian targets X X
Section F: Submarine, low profile arrangement for crew’s return
Arrangement made X X
No arrangement made X
Section G: Threats 
Threats and intimidation to crew if captured; family will suffer X X
No threats or intimidation to crew if captured X
Section H Money paid to crew 
Money paid to crew, around $3,000 X
No money paid to crew or crew; had to account for money spent; receipts X
Table 2: Threat Indicators
Types of Actions
1. Terrorist premeditated surprise attack mission to attack military or civilian targets
2. Escalation at point of interdiction/ability to attack if interdicted
3. Drug trafficking smuggling run—no means to attack
4. Terrorist trafficking smuggling run—no intent to attack but will attack to defend shipment
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The Ramsey  and Borner  Model offered the 
indicators and type of hostile intentions to 
intelligence analysts to assess the weight  of 
each  indicator  against  each  type of 
smuggling, terrorist,  or  coalition group and 
the type of threat  they  pose.  The authors 
endorse a similar  approach  in  completing  an 
analysis from  diverse groups — Coast Guard, 
O f f i c e o f N a v a l I n t e l l i g e n c e ,  D r u g 
Enforcement  Agency  and Central Intelligence 
Agency.62 The analysis from  each  group must 
determine the weight  given  to each  indicator 
in  the table above,  based on  knowledge of 
DTO,  narcoterrorists,  or  terrorist groups 
using the sea-based smuggling method.  
SUMMARY
When the mass of the information has been 
collected, the art is to sift the wheat from the 
chaff, and then to lay before the commander a 
short clear statement. 
 
Field Marshal Earl Alexander 
This article has presented a  model of South 
American  drug  traffickers,  drug traffickers’ 
terrorist coalitions,  and narco-terrorist 
groups that  use sea-based smuggling 
methods. The model is based on  the analysis 
of behavior  intentions and strategic  thinking, 
yielding  threat  assessment.  The model 
yielded four  possible attack scenarios.  The 
historical actions of South  American  sea-
based drug  trafficking organizations support 
the conclusion  that the current  strategy  of 
DTO is to exploit  the weaknesses of coastal 
defenses in  Central  America  and Southern 
Europe.  This study  supports the position  that 
the strategy  of South  American traffickers 
developing submarines is to attempt to use 
the submarine technology  to leap ahead of 
sea-based interdiction  methods. The authors 
contend that behavioral  indicators suggest  a 
non-terrorist  strategy  as part  of South 
American DTO sea-based smuggling.  
The developmental  progress within and 
between  LPV  and SPSS indicate clear  intent 
o f S o u t h  A m e r i c a n D T O t o a v o i d 
m i l i t a r i z a t i o n  o f t h e i r  f l e e t ,  w h i l e 
simultaneously  neutralizing  intelligence and 
law  enforcement detection  during smuggling 
operations. The developmental  progress 
within  and between smuggling vessels, when 
compared to the LTTE terrorist navy,  does 
not indicate South  American DTO have any 
intent to carry  offensive weapons.  The study 
of littoral terrorist  warfare indicates that 
attacks on  US Navy  ships have been from 
small open-craft  surface vessels that were 
similar  to small open-surface vessels used by 
the LTTE to attack the Sri Lanka navy. 
There has been  one land-based rocket 
attack  on US Navy  ships while in  a  harbor. 
The 2008 Mumbai attack, employing  small 
open craft  to insert terrorists into the 
country, is similar  to both  LTTE and North 
Korea  terrorist  operations with the 
understanding  that North Korea  has also 
employed mini-submarines to insert  terrorist 
kill teams into South  Korea.  Littoral warfare 
involving submarines attacking  navy  ships 
has been  conducted by  North  Korea  and 
included a  torpedo attack on  a  South  Korean 
ship at  sea. There is no indication  that any 
South  American drug  smuggling organization 
or  drug  terrorist  coalition  has constructed a 
submarine with  the purpose of inserting 
covert operatives or a torpedo system.  
During  the previous five  years,  the United 
States has evaluated specific behaviors of 
South  American  sea-based drug smugglers, 
such  as scuttling  vessels at  sea,  and has 
responded by  passing  the Drug Trafficking 
Interdiction  Assistance Act  of 2008. In 
response to the small open-vessel  attack and 
a  rocket  attack on US Navy  ships in harbors, 
the Navy  responded by  rewriting its Random 
Anti-Terrorism  Measures. Recent successes 
of Operation  Panama  Express support  the 
law  enforcement  approach  inherent  in  the 
Maritime Strategic Doctrine for  dismantling 
South  American  sea-based smuggling 
organizations. Drug  traffickers have built 
submarines on the west  coast  of Colombia 
and Ecuador, which  makes operating  them  in 
the Pacific  far more probable than  the 
Atlantic. Drug  terrorist  coalitions, although 
demonstrating  the technological expertise to 
c o n s t r u c t  a  s u b m a r i n e ,  h a v e n o t 
demonstrated the capability  to launch  a 
submarine from  the east  coast of South 
America  with  a crew  proficient  to navigate 
the Atlantic Ocean on  a  cruise to Africa  or 
Southern Europe. 
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A  significant indicator  will lie in the nature 
of the training,  be it  military  or  civilian, and 
the political and religious beliefs of the 
captain and crew  prescribing to radical jihad. 
Currently,  indications are that the captains 
and crews aboard smuggling  vessels remain 
nonpolitical and are not religious extremists. 
Changes in  the crew  makeup would be a 
significant indicator,  as would vessels with 
defensive or  offensive weapons. Once the 
smuggling  vessels are outfitted with  defensive 
weapons (anything with  more firepower  than 
a  single assault  rifle) among  the entire crew, 
there is significant potential for  a  Type 2 
Action  confrontation  between members 
supporting  the Maritime Strategic Doctrine 
and drug  traffickers at  sea.  Once defensive 
weapons are aboard sea-based smuggling 
vessels,  the drug  traffickers have signaled a 
profound shift  in  strategic thinking,  implying 
a  willingness to defend the smuggling 
shipping  lane with  force,  not unlike the 
defense of the land-based smuggling  lanes in 
Central and North America.
The authors are aware of the danger  of 
being  unprepared when  confronting  an 
adversary  who has made the strategic shift 
from  a  criminal response to one of terrorism. 
The comparison  between terrorist  strategies 
and tactics used by  land-based drug 
traffickers (i.e.,  Mexico) and South  American 
drug  traffickers militarizing  their  vessels and 
boats is a  significant  warning  to policy 
makers.  In  the event  that drug  organizations 
pursue the use of submarines with  the 
capability  to penetrate US territorial waters, a 
reevaluation  of current doctrine and policies 
must  take place prior  to a  confrontation. 
Although  some would argue that  an 
immediate policy  review  will escalate 
tensions,  the authors vehemently  disagree 
and maintain  that  it  is the drug  traffickers 
who would have escalated the situation  at  sea 
– an  environment that  is inherently 
dangerous and unforgiving.  The LTTE 
terrorist  tactics at sea and the DTO land-
based terrorist  tactics in  Central America  are 
precisely  the type of terrorist  behaviors that 
must  be resolved quickly.  Traditional 
antisubmarine warfare against  drug 
traffickers in  the littoral  zone will  require the 
United States to plan  for  defending civilian 
targets traditionally  off limits during  time of 
war. 
At  least  one South  American  drug 
organization  transferred advanced smuggling 
technology  to Southern  Europe and 
attempted a smuggling operation  using  a 
Type 2  vessel.  Buenaventura vessels cruise 
the Pacific  and rendezvous off the southwest 
coast of Mexico with  smugglers who 
transport  the drugs inland.  The authors’ 
position  is that  the smuggling technology 
most likely  to be transferred to a  terrorist 
organization  is Type 1-C  and/or  Type 1-D. 
The most  likely  conflict  at  sea  will be a  Type 2 
Action.  If terrorist-based rebel groups in 
South  America acquire  vessels or  a  boat,  Type 
1 and Type 4 actions are probable. 
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